Fancy loose talk about knowledge

dc.contributor.author	Russell, Gillian Kay
dc.date.accessioned	2021-11-08T18:30:08Z
dc.date.available	2021-11-08T18:30:08Z
dc.date.issued	2021-10-30
dc.identifier	276615501
dc.identifier	f39a5438-86d4-4344-82cb-cb791d7b054f
dc.identifier	85118470658
dc.identifier	000713036000001
dc.identifier.citation	Russell , G K 2021 , ' Fancy loose talk about knowledge ' , Inquiry , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2021.1990791	en
dc.identifier.issn	0020-174X
dc.identifier.other	Jisc: 00762e26c0744f399144a8853113200b
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10023/24293
dc.description.abstract	This paper argues for a version of sceptical invariantism about knowledge on which the acceptability of knowledge-attributing sentences varies with the context of assessment.
dc.format.extent	32
dc.format.extent	2519313
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Inquiry	en
dc.subject	Skeptical invariantism	en
dc.subject	Skepticism	en
dc.subject	Relativism	en
dc.subject	Context-sensitivity	en
dc.subject	Loose talk	en
dc.subject	B Philosophy (General)	en
dc.subject	T-NDAS	en
dc.subject.lcc	B1	en
dc.title	Fancy loose talk about knowledge	en
dc.type	Journal article	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. Philosophy	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1080/0020174x.2021.1990791
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed	en