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dc.contributor.authorBerto, Franz
dc.contributor.editorMras, Gabriele M.
dc.contributor.editorWeingartner, Paul
dc.contributor.editorRitter, Bernhard
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-10T11:30:21Z
dc.date.available2021-09-10T11:30:21Z
dc.date.issued2019-11-18
dc.identifier.citationBerto , F 2019 , Adding 4.0241 to TLP . in G M Mras , P Weingartner & B Ritter (eds) , Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics : Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium . Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society , vol. 27 , de Gruyter , Berlin , pp. 415-428 . https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-025en
dc.identifier.isbn9783110654301
dc.identifier.isbn9783110763478
dc.identifier.isbn9783110657883
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 266041683
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 6fe0d2f5-0d31-4368-9ef4-77c583005c63
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/68281768
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000680862200024
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/23941
dc.description.abstractTractatus 4.024 inspired the dominant semantics of our time: truth-conditional semantics. This is focused on possible worlds: the content ofpis theset of worlds wherepis true. It has become increasingly clear that such an accountis, at best, defective: we need an “independent factor in meaning, constrainedbut not determined by truth-conditions” (Yablo 2014: 2), because sentences can bedifferently true at the same possible worlds. I suggest a missing comment which,had it been included in theTractatus, would have helped semantics get this rightfrom the start. This is my 4.0241: “Knowing what is the case if a sentence is trueis knowing its ways of being true”: knowing a sentence’s truth possibilitiesandwhat we now call its topic, or subject matter. I show that the famous “fundamentalthought” that “the ‘logical constants’ do not represent” (4.0312) can be understoodin terms of ways-based views of meaning. Such views also help with puzzling claimslike 5.122: “Ifpfollows fromq, the sense of ‘p’ is contained in that of ‘q’ ”, whichare compatible with a conception of entailment combining truth-preservation withthe preservation of topicality, or of ways of being true.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherde Gruyter
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy of Logic and Mathematicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPublications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Societyen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-025en
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBCen
dc.titleAdding 4.0241 to TLPen
dc.typeConference itemen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783110657883-025
dc.date.embargoedUntil2020-11-18


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