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dc.contributor.authorBerge, Tarald Laudal
dc.contributor.authorSt John, Taylor
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-24T23:38:14Z
dc.date.available2021-08-24T23:38:14Z
dc.date.issued2020-02-25
dc.identifier.citationBerge , T L & St John , T 2020 , ' Asymmetric diffusion : World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws ' , Review of International Political Economy , vol. Latest Articles , pp. 1-27 . https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429en
dc.identifier.issn0969-2290
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 265733519
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: e4984ad6-faeb-46eb-abda-ee1c21474aaf
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-8582-5444/work/69835196
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000516736400001
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85092903479
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/23826
dc.description.abstractGlobally, 74 countries have domestic investment laws that mention investor-state arbitration and 42 of these laws provide consent to it. That is, they give foreign investors the right to bypass national courts and bring claims directly to arbitration. What explains this variation, and why do any governments include investor-state arbitration in domestic legislation? We argue that governments incorporate arbitration into their domestic laws because doing so was labelled ‘international best practice’ by specialist units at the World Bank. We introduce the concept of asymmetric diffusion, which occurs when a policy is framed as international best practice but only recommended to a subset of states. No developed state consents to arbitration in their domestic law, nor does the World Bank recommend that they do so. Yet we show that governments who receive technical assistance from the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service are more likely to include arbitration in their laws. We first use event history analysis and find that receiving World Bank technical assistance is an exceptionally strong predictor of domestic investment laws with arbitration. Then we illustrate our argument with a case study of the Kyrgyz Republic’s 2003 law.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofReview of International Political Economyen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429en
dc.subjectForeign direct investmenten
dc.subjectNational investment lawsen
dc.subjectInvestor-state dispute settlementen
dc.subjectWorld Banken
dc.subjectArbitrationen
dc.subjectTechnical assistanceen
dc.subjectTemplatesen
dc.subjectJC Political theoryen
dc.subjectHG Financeen
dc.subject3rd-DASen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subject.lccJCen
dc.subject.lccHGen
dc.titleAsymmetric diffusion : World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment lawsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of International Relationsen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Centre for Global Law and Governanceen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2021-08-25
dc.identifier.urlhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3447365en


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