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dc.contributor.authorBarnes, Nicholas
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-24T16:30:10Z
dc.date.available2021-08-24T16:30:10Z
dc.date.issued2021-08-15
dc.identifier.citationBarnes , N 2021 , ' The logic of criminal territorial control : military intervention in Rio de Janeiro ' , Comparative Political Studies , vol. OnlineFirst . https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211036035en
dc.identifier.issn0010-4140
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 275119259
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 3b0f4a45-bdaa-496d-b00c-4d3f182c54fa
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85112717139
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-9559-6676/work/99116340
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000685830900001
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/23825
dc.descriptionThe fieldwork on which this article is based received generous funding from the Social Science Research Council, the National Science Foundation, and the U.S. Department of Education Fulbright Program.en
dc.description.abstractHow do organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several explanations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches, and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however, has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and explanations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to respond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn violent during intervention.
dc.format.extent43
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofComparative Political Studiesen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2021. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page.en
dc.subjectOrganized crimeen
dc.subjectDrug traffickingen
dc.subjectGangsen
dc.subjectMilitary interventionen
dc.subjectTerritorial controlen
dc.subjectEthnographyen
dc.subjectRio de Janeiroen
dc.subjectJZ International relationsen
dc.subjectE-NDASen
dc.subject.lccJZen
dc.titleThe logic of criminal territorial control : military intervention in Rio de Janeiroen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of International Relationsen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211036035
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.identifier.urlhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/00104140211036035en


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