What's the matter with super-Humeanism?
Abstract
Esfeld has proposed a minimalist ontology of nature called ‘super-Humeanism’ that purports to accommodate quantum phenomena and avoid standard objections to neo-Humean metaphysics. I argue that Esfeld’s sparse ontology has counterintuitive consequences and generates two self-undermining dilemmas concerning the nature of time and space. Contrary to Esfeld, I deny that super-Humeanism supports an ontology of microscopic particles that follow continuous trajectories through space.
Citation
Simpson , W 2019 , ' What's the matter with super-Humeanism? ' , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , vol. In press , axz028 . https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axz028
Publication
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0007-0882Type
Journal article
Description
The author would like to acknowledge the financial support of Peterhouse (Cambridge) in the form of a Blacker–Loewe Doctoral Studentship in Philosophy.Collections
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