What's the matter with super-Humeanism?
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Esfeld has proposed a minimalist ontology of nature called ‘super-Humeanism’ that purports to accommodate quantum phenomena and avoid standard objections to neo-Humean metaphysics. I argue that Esfeld’s sparse ontology has counterintuitive consequences and generates two self-undermining dilemmas concerning the nature of time and space. Contrary to Esfeld, I deny that super-Humeanism supports an ontology of microscopic particles that follow continuous trajectories through space.
Simpson , W 2019 , ' What's the matter with super-Humeanism? ' , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , vol. In press , axz028 . https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axz028
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Copyright © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axz028
DescriptionThe author would like to acknowledge the financial support of Peterhouse (Cambridge) in the form of a Blacker–Loewe Doctoral Studentship in Philosophy.
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