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dc.contributor.authorKatsoulacos, Yannis
dc.contributor.authorMotchenkova, Evgenia
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-04T23:44:47Z
dc.date.available2021-06-04T23:44:47Z
dc.date.issued2019-10-03
dc.identifier.citationKatsoulacos , Y , Motchenkova , E & Ulph , D 2019 , ' Penalizing cartels—a spectrum of regimes ' , Journal of Antitrust Enforcement , vol. 7 , no. 3 , pp. 339-351 . https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnz013en
dc.identifier.issn2050-0696
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 259230806
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 4c11774c-153b-4b5a-b8d5-13b82c25c934
dc.identifier.otherBibtex: urn:4990af8b63dd0278d0a4420b3b06f785
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464512
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85077754975
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000515095400005
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/23310
dc.description.abstractThere has been much discussion by both academics and policymakers of the most appropriate way of penalizing cartels taking account of both the effects of different penalty regimes on welfare as well as various implementation considerations such as ease/cost of implementation and transparency/legal certainty. Consequently there now exists a range of proposed penalty regimes—including two put forward by ourselves. While these can all seem like very distinct regimes, in this article we show that they can usefully be thought of as lying along a spectrum, inter-connected by the idea of trying to penalize cartels in relation to the damage they cause. They differ in their informational requirements, and in particular whether some key factors needed to calculate the penalty are case-specific or an average across a wide range of cases. Subtle differences in what information is required and how it is used can sometimes cause significant changes in either the welfare or implementation properties of regimes. This new perspective may provide a helpful way of organizing the discussion about the pros and cons of the different proposals.
dc.format.extent13
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Antitrust Enforcementen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnz013en
dc.subjectAntitrust penaltiesen
dc.subjectAntitrust enforcementen
dc.subjectAntitrust lawen
dc.subjectCartelsen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titlePenalizing cartels—a spectrum of regimesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnz013
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2021-06-05


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