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dc.contributor.authorPummer, Theron Gene
dc.contributor.editorGamlund, Espen
dc.contributor.editorSolberg, Carl Tollef
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-21T00:42:41Z
dc.date.available2021-03-21T00:42:41Z
dc.date.issued2019-03-21
dc.identifier.citationPummer , T G 2019 , The worseness of nonexistence . in E Gamlund & C T Solberg (eds) , Saving people from the harm of death . Population-level bioethics , Oxford University Press , New York , pp. 215-228 . https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0016en
dc.identifier.isbn9780190921415
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 245552760
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 14e531bf-d545-4ebe-b01e-9dd22fe7bc2e
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-0147-9917/work/69029342
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/21676
dc.description.abstractMost believe that it is worse for a person to die than to continue to exist with a good life. At the same time, many believe that it is not worse for a merely possible person never to exist than to exist with a good life. I argue that if the underlying properties that make us the sort of thing we essentially are can come in small degrees, then to maintain this commonly held pair of beliefs we will have to embrace an implausible sort of evaluative hypersensitivity to slight nonevaluative differences. Avoidance of such hypersensitivity pressures us to accept that it can be worse for merely possible people never to exist. If this conclusion is correct, then the standard basis for giving no or less priority to merely possible persons would disappear (i.e., that things cannot be better or worse for them). Though defenders of Person-Affecting Views and their opponents may still disagree in theory, they could arrive at the same answers to many monumentally important practical questions.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.relation.ispartofSaving people from the harm of deathen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPopulation-level bioethicsen
dc.rights© 2019 Oxford University Press. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the final published version of the work, which was originally published at https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0016en
dc.subjectComparativismen
dc.subjectDeathen
dc.subjectHypersensitivityen
dc.subjectIndeterminacyen
dc.subjectNonexistenceen
dc.subjectPerson-Affecting Viewsen
dc.subjectPersonal identityen
dc.subjectPopulation ethicsen
dc.subjectReductionismen
dc.subjectBJ Ethicsen
dc.subject.lccBJen
dc.titleThe worseness of nonexistenceen
dc.typeBook itemen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0016
dc.date.embargoedUntil2021-03-21
dc.identifier.urlhttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.001.0001en
dc.identifier.urlhttps://global.oup.com/academic/product/saving-people-from-the-harm-of-death-9780190921415en


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