Attitudes first: rationality attributions and the normativity of rationality

Abstract

This thesis has two distinct aims. The first is to shed light on our practice of attributing rationality to others. To begin, Chapter 2 demonstrates that we cannot rely on questions of what rationality requires to make sense of this practice. Chapter 3 explores a different strategy and directly engages with rationality attributions. It lays out some desiderata for an adequate account of such attributions. Chapter 4 develops a novel account of rationality attributions. This account focusses on explicitly mentioning sets of an agent’s attitudes, and also includes a measure for the attribution’s robustness. Thanks to these features, the account meets the desiderata, and also allows for progress on persisting disagreements in the debate. Chapter 5 further illustrates the account by contrasting it with an alternative contextualist understanding of rationality attributions.

The second aim of this thesis is to defend the Normativity of Rationality. In Chapter 6, I consider problems for a reasons-based understanding of the Normativity of Rationality which arise from so-called transmission principles, and point out strategies to defend rationality’s normativity. Chapter 7 provides further support for one of these strategies. Finally, Chapter 8 presents my positive argument. I propose to understand rationality’s normativity in terms of commitment – if you are rationally required to x, you are committed to x. Commitment can avoid the counter-examples of alternative understandings in terms of reasons or ought by combining features of both notions. This makes commitment a promising normative notion in its own right.