Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorChattopadhyay, Subir
dc.contributor.authorMitka, Malgorzata M.
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-13T00:39:20Z
dc.date.available2021-02-13T00:39:20Z
dc.date.issued2019-10
dc.identifier.citationChattopadhyay , S & Mitka , M M 2019 , ' Nash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade model ' , Journal of Mathematical Economics , vol. 84 , pp. 225-242 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.011en
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 260661316
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 84ce140e-76cf-4729-a921-e293d510f2cf
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-9828-3843/work/62668462
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85071762391
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000488145200021
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/21424
dc.description.abstractWe study a general equilibrium model of trade with two goods and many countries where each country sets its distortionary tariff noncooperatively to maximize the payoff of the representative household. We prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria by showing that there are consistent bounds on tariff rates that are common across countries and that payoff functions in the induced game are quasiconcave. Separately, we show that best responses are strictly increasing functions, and provide robust examples that show that the game need not be supermodular. The fact that a country’s payoff does not respond monotonically to increases in a competitor’s tariff rate, shows that the standard condition in the literature for payoff comparisons across Nash equilibria fails in our model. We then show that the participation of at most two countries in negotiated tariff changes suffices to induce a Pareto improving allocation relative to a Nash equilibrium. Further results provided concern the location of the best response in relation to the free trade point, the monotonicity of payoffs, and the bounds on equilibrium strategies. The final result is that there is no trade if and only if the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Mathematical Economicsen
dc.rights© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher's policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.011en
dc.subjectRetaliatory tariffsen
dc.subjectMulti-countryen
dc.subjectPure strategyen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleNash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade modelen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.011
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2021-02-13


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record