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dc.contributor.authorProsser, Simon
dc.identifier.citationProsser , S 2020 , ' The metaphysics of mental files ' , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , vol. 100 , no. 3 , pp. 657-676 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 257295292
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 974ddc89-1dd0-4f3c-a8bc-465bc2786208
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85060347538
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-7444-2782/work/67525833
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000532571500007
dc.description.abstractThere is much to be said for a diachronic or interpersonal individuation of singular modes of presentation (MOPs) in terms of a criterion of epistemic transparency between thought tokens. This way of individuating MOPs has been discussed recently within the mental files framework, though the issues discussed here arise for all theories that individuate MOPs in terms of relations among tokens. All such theories face objections concerning apparent failures of the transitivity of the ‘same MOP’ relation. For mental files, these transitivity failures most obviously occur because mental files can merge or undergo fission. In this paper I argue that this problem is easily resolved once mental files are properly construed as continuants, whose metaphysics is analogous to that of persons or physical objects. All continuants can undergo fission or fusion, leading to similar transitivity problems, but there are well-established theories of persistence that accommodate this. I suggest that, in particular, the stage theory best suits the purposes of a continuant theory of MOPs.
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy and Phenomenological Researchen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2019 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleThe metaphysics of mental filesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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