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dc.contributor.authorKatsoulacos, Yannis
dc.contributor.authorMotchenkova, Evgenia
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David Tregear
dc.identifier.citationKatsoulacos , Y , Motchenkova , E & Ulph , D T 2019 , ' Penalising on the basis of the severity of the offence : a sophisticated revenue-based cartel penalty ' , Review of Industrial Organization , vol. In press .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 261987606
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 6e00eccf-9ce2-402d-86d8-ccddc560410f
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/64361506
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85074811254
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000494930500001
dc.description.abstractWe propose a new penalty regime for cartels in which the penalty base is the revenue of the cartel but the penalty rate increases in a systematic and transparent way with the cartel overcharge. The proposed regime formalises how revenue can be used as the base while taking into account the severity of the offence. We show that this regime has better welfare properties than the simple revenue-based regime under which the penalty rate is fixed, while having relatively low levels of implementation costs and uncertainty. We conclude that the proposed penalty regime deserves serious consideration by Competition Authorities.
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Industrial Organizationen
dc.subjectAntitrust enforcementen
dc.subjectAntitrust penaltiesen
dc.subjectAntitrust lawen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectHD28 Management. Industrial Managementen
dc.titlePenalising on the basis of the severity of the offence : a sophisticated revenue-based cartel penaltyen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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