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dc.contributor.authorÖzgün, Aybüke
dc.contributor.authorBerto, Franz
dc.identifier.citationÖzgün , A & Berto , F 2020 , ' Dynamic hyperintensional belief revision ' , The Review of Symbolic Logic , vol. FirstView .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 270641586
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 3aa82c35-86c4-4229-94c9-9a3a38dbff4c
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/81797861
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85094599162
dc.description.abstractWe propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The key idea we exploit to achieve non-omniscience focuses on topic- or subject matter-sensitivity: a feature of belief states which is gaining growing attention in the recent literature.
dc.relation.ispartofThe Review of Symbolic Logicen
dc.rightsCopyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2020. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectBelief revisionen
dc.subjectDynamic epistemic logicen
dc.subjectLogical omniscienceen
dc.subjectSubject matteren
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.titleDynamic hyperintensional belief revisionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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