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Optimal quality certification

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dc.contributor.authorZapechelnyuk, Andriy
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-23T14:30:02Z
dc.date.available2020-07-23T14:30:02Z
dc.date.issued2020-06-01
dc.identifier.citationZapechelnyuk , A 2020 , ' Optimal quality certification ' , American Economic Review: Insights , vol. 2 , no. 2 , pp. 161-176 . https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20190387en
dc.identifier.issn2640-205X
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 261745691
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 4898f947-ec85-420a-a366-13d8511d9335
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-5033-3848/work/77893893
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000672747800002
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/20319
dc.descriptionFinancial support from the Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/N01829X/1 is gratefully acknowledged.en
dc.description.abstractQuality certification not only informs consumers, but also stimulates producers to supply better quality products. We study a problem of quality certification in a moral hazard setting. We show that, under standard assumptions, simple certification systems, such as quality assurance rule and pass-fail rule, are optimal. Our solution method involves interpreting the certification problem as a delegation problem.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Economic Review: Insightsen
dc.rightsCopyright 2020 American Economic Association. All rights reserved. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20190387en
dc.subjectCertificationen
dc.subjectBayesian persuasionen
dc.subjectInformation disclosureen
dc.subjectInformation designen
dc.subjectDelegationen
dc.subjectMoral hazarden
dc.subjectCareer concernsen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleOptimal quality certificationen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorEconomic & Social Research Councilen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20190387
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2020-06-01
dc.identifier.grantnumberES/N01829X/1en


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