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dc.contributor.authorO'Brien, Phillips Payson
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-06T23:35:03Z
dc.date.available2020-07-06T23:35:03Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier252004331
dc.identifiera64e61c7-d9fa-43e4-bab5-d146fa257972
dc.identifier85059665824
dc.identifier000491200300005
dc.identifier.citationO'Brien , P P 2020 , ' The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the atom bomb, the American military mind and the end of the Second World War ' , Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 42 , no. 7 , pp. 971-991 . https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1559150en
dc.identifier.issn0140-2390
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-7097-4298/work/65014389
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/20214
dc.description.abstractThe decision by the US government to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is one of the most heavily debated questions in history. This article examines one element of that debate, in many ways the most surprising. That was the different views of the top of the military hierarchy in the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was on the whole more sceptical about using atomic weaponry than the USA’s civilian leadership, for ethical and strategic reasons. As such they were willing to consider very different ways of ending the war.
dc.format.extent711675
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Strategic Studiesen
dc.subjectWorld War 1939-1945en
dc.subjectAtomic bomben
dc.subjectJoint Chiefs of StafFen
dc.subjectJZ International relationsen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subject.lccJZen
dc.titleThe Joint Chiefs of Staff, the atom bomb, the American military mind and the end of the Second World Waren
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of International Relationsen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/01402390.2018.1559150
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2020-07-07


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