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Corporate social responsibility and executive compensation: the negative externality perspective
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dc.contributor.author | Marhfor, Ahmed | |
dc.contributor.author | Bouslah, Kais Ben Hmida | |
dc.contributor.author | M’Zali, Bouchra | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-03T12:30:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-03T12:30:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-03-31 | |
dc.identifier | 267208515 | |
dc.identifier | 2c60249c-903a-4585-9ac3-8767545cd380 | |
dc.identifier | 85082797538 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Marhfor , A , Bouslah , K B H & M’Zali , B 2020 , ' Corporate social responsibility and executive compensation: the negative externality perspective ' , Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives , vol. 9 , no. 1 , pp. 15-31 . https://doi.org/10.35944/jofrp.2020.9.1.002 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 2305-7394 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0001-8407-8929/work/82179573 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19752 | |
dc.description.abstract | This research develops a new argument that departs from traditional theories that explain the potential impact of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Chiefs Executive Officers (CEOs) compensation. More specifically, we argue that if CSR investments provide value for firm’s shareholders and stakeholders, they can also decrease firm’s competitors’ value (negative externality hypothesis). As a result, inefficient CEO compensation may arise even if CSR choice allows managers to act in the best interest of firm’s shareholders and non-investing stakeholders. In sum, our new perspective indicates that excessive levels of CEO compensation are more than a principal-agent-stakeholder problem. In addition, our new theoretical argument suggests that voluntarily CSR should not be a relevant factor for achieving efficient levels of CEO compensation. | |
dc.format.extent | 17 | |
dc.format.extent | 378964 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives | en |
dc.subject | Corporate social responsibility | en |
dc.subject | CEO compensation | en |
dc.subject | Negative externality | en |
dc.subject | Market failure | en |
dc.subject | Stakeholder`s management | en |
dc.subject | Public interest theory | en |
dc.subject | HG Finance | en |
dc.subject | H Social Sciences | en |
dc.subject | 3rd-DAS | en |
dc.subject | SDG 12 - Responsible Consumption and Production | en |
dc.subject.lcc | HG | en |
dc.subject.lcc | H | en |
dc.title | Corporate social responsibility and executive compensation: the negative externality perspective | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Centre for the Study of Philanthropy & Public Good | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Centre for Responsible Banking and Finance | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. School of Management | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.35944/jofrp.2020.9.1.002 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.identifier.url | http://www.acrn-journals.eu/jofrpvol901p15.html | en |
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