Revisionary analysis without meaning change (or, could women be analytically oppressed?)
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This chapter develops a conception of philosophical analysis which makes sense of the idea that a correct analysis can be revisionary (in that it departs from ordinary or expert belief and linguistic usage). The view is superior to the alternatives defended by most proponents of ‘conceptual ethics’ and ‘conceptual engineering’ (according to which revisionary theorizing involves replacing words or concepts) because it better explains the arguments we advance when we engage with proposed revisionary analyses. A key idea is that analytic claims can emerge in the course of debate without change of meaning, so that our acceptance (perhaps late in the debate) of some analyticity can fix the meaning of a word as we used it all along. The discussion focuses on Haslanger’s revisionary analysis of gender.
Ball , D N 2020 , Revisionary analysis without meaning change (or, could women be analytically oppressed?) . in A Burgess , H Cappelen & D Plunkett (eds) , Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics . Oxford University Press , Oxford , pp. 36-58 . https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0002
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
Copyright 2020 Derek Ball. This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), a copy of which is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
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