The generality of particular thought
Abstract
Argues against a strong version of Evans's generality constraint, and for a weak version. This paper is about the claim that, necessarily, a subject who can think that a is F must also have the capacities to think that a is G, a is H, a is I, and so on (for some reasonable range of G, H, I), and that b is F, c is F, d is F, and so on (for some reasonable range of b, c, d). I set out, and raise objections to, two arguments for a strong version of this claim (Gareth Evans' generality constraint). I present a new argument for a weaker version of the claim, and sketch some directions of enquiry which this new argument opens up.
Citation
Dickie , I 2010 , ' The generality of particular thought ' , The Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 60 , no. 240 , pp. 508-531 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.629.x
Publication
The Philosophical Quarterly
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0031-8094Type
Journal article
Collections
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