The generality of particular thought
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Argues against a strong version of Evans's generality constraint, and for a weak version. This paper is about the claim that, necessarily, a subject who can think that a is F must also have the capacities to think that a is G, a is H, a is I, and so on (for some reasonable range of G, H, I), and that b is F, c is F, d is F, and so on (for some reasonable range of b, c, d). I set out, and raise objections to, two arguments for a strong version of this claim (Gareth Evans' generality constraint). I present a new argument for a weaker version of the claim, and sketch some directions of enquiry which this new argument opens up.
Dickie , I 2010 , ' The generality of particular thought ' , The Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 60 , no. 240 , pp. 508-531 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.629.x
The Philosophical Quarterly
© 2009 The Author, Journal compilation © 2009 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.629.x
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