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dc.contributor.authorDickie, Imogen
dc.identifier.citationDickie , I 2011 , ' III - How proper names refer ' , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 111 , no. 1 , pp. 43-78 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 261206278
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 760886f2-c3de-48da-aeff-700d624a22b9
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 80052428681
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-9346-643X/work/69029591
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a new account of reference-fixing for proper names. The account is built around an intuitive claim about reference fixing: the claim that I am a participant in a practice of using α to refer to o only if my uses of α are constrained by the representationally relevant ways it is possible for o to behave. §I raises examples that suggest that a right account of how proper names refer should incorporate this claim. §II provides such an account.
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the Aristotelian Societyen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Aristotelian Society, 2011. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectProper namesen
dc.subjectCausail theoryen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleIII - How proper names referen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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