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dc.contributor.authorDickie, Imogen
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-13T16:35:52Z
dc.date.available2020-02-13T16:35:52Z
dc.date.issued2011-08-30
dc.identifier261206278
dc.identifier760886f2-c3de-48da-aeff-700d624a22b9
dc.identifier80052428681
dc.identifier.citationDickie , I 2011 , ' III - How proper names refer ' , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 111 , no. 1 , pp. 43-78 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00298.xen
dc.identifier.issn0066-7374
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-9346-643X/work/69029591
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/19456
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a new account of reference-fixing for proper names. The account is built around an intuitive claim about reference fixing: the claim that I am a participant in a practice of using α to refer to o only if my uses of α are constrained by the representationally relevant ways it is possible for o to behave. §I raises examples that suggest that a right account of how proper names refer should incorporate this claim. §II provides such an account.
dc.format.extent36
dc.format.extent267549
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the Aristotelian Societyen
dc.subjectProper namesen
dc.subjectReferenceen
dc.subjectCausail theoryen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleIII - How proper names referen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00298.x
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.identifier.urlhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/41331541?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contentsen


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