Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorRead, Stephen Louis
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-06T10:30:03Z
dc.date.available2020-02-06T10:30:03Z
dc.date.issued2020-03
dc.identifier259299902
dc.identifier89a64bb7-c3b9-444f-90f5-7c1c01b7c791
dc.identifier85079464083
dc.identifier000511057500001
dc.identifier.citationRead , S L 2020 , ' Swyneshed, Aristotle and the Rule of Contradictory Pairs ' , Logica Universalis , vol. 14 , no. 1 , pp. 27-50 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-020-00246-1en
dc.identifier.issn1661-8297
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-2181-2609/work/68647995
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/19416
dc.description.abstractRoger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles (logical paradoxes), dating from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries from his solution. The third states that there is a contradictory pair of propositions both of which are false. This appears to contradict what Whitaker, in his iconoclastic reading of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, dubbed “The Rule of Contradictory Pairs” (RCP), which requires that in every such pair, one must be true and the other false. Whitaker argued that, immediately after defining the notion of a contradictory pair, in which one statement affirms what the other denies of the same thing, Aristotle himself gave counterexamples to the rule. This gives some credence to Swyneshed’s claim that his solution to the logical paradoxes is not contrary to Aristotle’s teaching, as many of Swyneshed’s contemporaries claimed. Insolubles are false, he said, because they falsify themselves; and their contradictories are false because they falsely deny that the insoluble itself is false. Swyneshed’s solution depends crucially on the revision he makes to the acount of truth and falsehood, brought out in his first thesis: that a false proposition can signify as it is, or as Paul of Venice, who took up and developed Swyneshed’s solution some sixty years later, puts it, a false proposition can have a true significate. Swyneshed gave a further counterexample to (RCP) when he claimed that some insolubles, like future contingents, are neither true nor false. Dialetheism, the contemporary claim that some propositions are both true and false, is wedded to the Rule, and in consequence divorces denial from the assertion of the contradictory negation. Consequently, Swyneshed’s logical heresy is very different from that found in dialetheism.
dc.format.extent24
dc.format.extent386479
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofLogica Universalisen
dc.subjectContradictionen
dc.subjectSignificationen
dc.subjectLiar paradoxen
dc.subjectInsolublesen
dc.subjectTruthen
dc.subjectAristotleen
dc.subjectRoger Swynesheden
dc.subjectWilliam Heytesburyen
dc.subjectRobert Elanden
dc.subjectRalph Strodeen
dc.subjectPaul of Veniceen
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBCen
dc.titleSwyneshed, Aristotle and the Rule of Contradictory Pairsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorThe Leverhulme Trusten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. St Andrews Institute of Medieval Studiesen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11787-020-00246-1
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.identifier.grantnumberRPG-2016-333en


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record