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The fundamental problem of logical omniscience
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dc.contributor.author | Hawke, Peter | |
dc.contributor.author | Özgün, Aybüke | |
dc.contributor.author | Berto, Franz | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-12-24T12:30:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-12-24T12:30:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-12-20 | |
dc.identifier | 263439332 | |
dc.identifier | 0042be55-5fd4-4cb1-9bf6-37f940d28a7d | |
dc.identifier | 85077025621 | |
dc.identifier | 000503673300002 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Hawke , P , Özgün , A & Berto , F 2019 , ' The fundamental problem of logical omniscience ' , Journal of Philosophical Logic , vol. Online First . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09536-6 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-3611 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/66591983 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19205 | |
dc.description.abstract | We propose a solution to the problem of logical omniscience in what we take to be its fundamental version: as concerning arbitrary agents and the knowledge attitude per se. Our logic of knowledge is a spin-off from a general theory of thick content, whereby the content of a sentence has two components: (i) an intension, taking care of truth conditions; and (ii) a topic, taking care of subject matter. We present a list of plausible logical validities and invalidities for the logic of knowledge per se for arbitrary agents, and isolate three explanatory factors for them: (1) the topic-sensitivity of content; (2) the fragmentation of knowledge states; (3) the defeasibility of knowledge acquisition. We then present a novel dynamic epistemic logic that yields precisely the desired validities and invalidities, for which we provide expressivity and completeness results. We contrast this with related systems and address possible objections. | |
dc.format.extent | 40 | |
dc.format.extent | 933505 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Philosophical Logic | en |
dc.subject | Aboutness | en |
dc.subject | Subject matter | en |
dc.subject | Logical omniscience | en |
dc.subject | Dynamic epistemic logic | en |
dc.subject | Thick content | en |
dc.subject | BC Logic | en |
dc.subject | T-NDAS | en |
dc.subject.lcc | BC | en |
dc.title | The fundamental problem of logical omniscience | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.contributor.sponsor | European Research Council | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Philosophy | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10992-019-09536-6 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.date.embargoedUntil | 2019-11-20 | |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | 681404 | en |
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