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dc.contributor.authorRead, Stephen Louis
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-18T13:30:02Z
dc.date.available2019-11-18T13:30:02Z
dc.date.issued2019-11-18
dc.identifier261426356
dc.identifieraf43dc0e-9806-42cd-9a57-1d3dd199bfce
dc.identifier000497726000005
dc.identifier.citationRead , S L 2019 , ' Anti-exceptionalism about logic ' , The Australasian Journal of Logic , vol. 16 , no. 7 , 6 , pp. 298-318 . https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5926en
dc.identifier.issn1448-5052
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-2181-2609/work/65014588
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/18946
dc.description.abstractAnti-exceptionalism about logic is the doctrine that logic does not require its own epistemology, for its methods are continuous with those of science. Although most recently urged by Williamson, the idea goes back at least to Lakatos, who wanted to adapt Popper's falsificationism and extend it not only to mathematics but to logic as well. But one needs to be careful here to distinguish the empirical from the a posteriori. Lakatos coined the term 'quasi-empirical' for the counterinstances to putative mathematical and logical theses. Mathematics and logic may both be a posteriori, but it does not follow that they are empirical. Indeed, as Williamson has demonstrated, what counts as empirical knowledge, and the role of experience in acquiring knowledge, are both unclear. Moreover, knowledge, even of necessary truths, is fallible. Nonetheless, logical consequence holds in virtue of the meaning of the logical terms, just asconsequence in general holds in virtue of the meanings of the concepts involved; and so logic is both analytic and necessary. In this respect, it is exceptional. But its methodology and its epistemology are the same as those of mathematics and science in being fallibilist, and counterexamples to seemingly analytic truths are as likely as those in any scientific endeavour. What is needed is a new account of the evidential basis of knowledge, one which is, perhaps surprisingly, found in Aristotle.
dc.format.extent319708
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofThe Australasian Journal of Logicen
dc.subjecta posteriorien
dc.subjectAnalyticen
dc.subjectNecessaryen
dc.subjectAristotleen
dc.subjectLakatosen
dc.subjectWilliamsonen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.subject.lccBCen
dc.titleAnti-exceptionalism about logicen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. St Andrews Institute of Medieval Studiesen
dc.identifier.doi10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5926
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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