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dc.contributor.advisorScharp, Kevin
dc.contributor.advisorSnedegar, Justin
dc.contributor.authorKim, Jiwon
dc.coverage.spatial[7], 107 p.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-05T13:55:45Z
dc.date.available2019-11-05T13:55:45Z
dc.date.issued2019-12-04
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/18849
dc.description.abstractMoral indeterminacy appears to be incompatible with moral realism at first glance because moral realists believe that there are objective moral facts in the world, which seem determinate. Given the commitment to objective moral facts, moral realists would want to argue that there can be a considerable amount of convergence on moral matters. However, moral disagreement is too prevalent for realists to be optimistic that there will be convergence sometime in the future. Some moral disagreements seem to remain irresolvable or even faultless. Since it is reasonable to think that moral disagreements arise because there is indeterminacy, moral realists would want to explain indeterminacy without any inconsistency or incompatibility. I argue that moral realism is compatible with every kind of indeterminacy: metaphysical indeterminacy, semantic indeterminacy, and epistemic indeterminacy. What I contribute to indeterminacy and moral realism debate is that, in contrast with how some philosophers argue that all moral indeterminacy can be reduced to metaphysical indeterminacy or epistemicism, I argue that every kind of indeterminacy has its own place. I show that each kind of indeterminacy is helpful for moral realists to explain different types of moral disagreement: faultless moral disagreement can be explained through semantic indeterminacy; irresolvable moral disagreement can be explained through metaphysical indeterminacy; resolvable disagreement can be explained through epistemicism. The upshot of my research is that moral realists can still uphold their tenets on moral objectivity and truth while embracing indeterminacy, the cause of disagreement, at the same time. If the strength of a metaethical theory is measured by how much explanation it can provide, my dissertation shows that moral realism wins over anti-realism in this regard.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectMoral realismen_US
dc.subjectIndeterminacyen_US
dc.subjectVaguenessen_US
dc.subjectEpistemicismen_US
dc.subjectIndexicalen_US
dc.subjectCreeping minimalismen_US
dc.subject.lccBJ1500.M67K5
dc.subject.lcshMoral realismen
dc.subject.lcshVagueness (Philosophy)en
dc.subject.lcshEpistemicsen
dc.titleTaking moral indeterminacy seriously : in defence of compatibility between moral realism and indeterminacyen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnameMPhil Master of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.17630/10023-18849


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    Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
    Except where otherwise noted within the work, this item's license for re-use is described as Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International