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Optimal quality certification
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dc.contributor.author | Zapechelnyuk, Andriy | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-04T10:30:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-04T10:30:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-10-21 | |
dc.identifier | 262624249 | |
dc.identifier | 1d7020e1-8e1c-486e-94fd-9c3a0e563e3c | |
dc.identifier.citation | Zapechelnyuk , A 2019 ' Optimal quality certification ' School of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper , no. 1904 , University of St Andrews , St Andrews . | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0962-4031 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0001-5033-3848/work/64034812 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18840 | |
dc.description | Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/N01829X/1 is gratefully acknowledged. | en |
dc.description.abstract | Quality certification not only informs consumers, but also stimulates producers to supply better quality products. We study a problem of quality certification in a moral hazard setting. We show that, under standard assumptions, simple certification systems, such as quality assurance rule and pass-fail rule, are optimal. Our solution method involves interpreting the certification problem as a delegation problem. | |
dc.format.extent | 16 | |
dc.format.extent | 371498 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | University of St Andrews | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | School of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper | en |
dc.subject | Certification | en |
dc.subject | Bayesian persuasion | en |
dc.subject | Information disclosure | en |
dc.subject | Information design | en |
dc.subject | Delegation | en |
dc.subject | Moral hazard | en |
dc.subject | Career concerns | en |
dc.subject | HB Economic Theory | en |
dc.subject.lcc | HB | en |
dc.title | Optimal quality certification | en |
dc.type | Working or discussion paper | en |
dc.contributor.sponsor | Economic & Social Research Council | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. School of Economics and Finance | en |
dc.identifier.url | https://ideas.repec.org/p/san/wpecon/1904.html | en |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | ES/N01829X/1 | en |
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