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dc.contributor.authorZapechelnyuk, Andriy
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-04T10:30:02Z
dc.date.available2019-11-04T10:30:02Z
dc.date.issued2019-10-21
dc.identifier262624249
dc.identifier1d7020e1-8e1c-486e-94fd-9c3a0e563e3c
dc.identifier.citationZapechelnyuk , A 2019 ' Optimal quality certification ' School of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper , no. 1904 , University of St Andrews , St Andrews .en
dc.identifier.issn0962-4031
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-5033-3848/work/64034812
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/18840
dc.descriptionFinancial support from the Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/N01829X/1 is gratefully acknowledged.en
dc.description.abstractQuality certification not only informs consumers, but also stimulates producers to supply better quality products. We study a problem of quality certification in a moral hazard setting. We show that, under standard assumptions, simple certification systems, such as quality assurance rule and pass-fail rule, are optimal. Our solution method involves interpreting the certification problem as a delegation problem.
dc.format.extent16
dc.format.extent371498
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics and Finance Discussion Paperen
dc.subjectCertificationen
dc.subjectBayesian persuasionen
dc.subjectInformation disclosureen
dc.subjectInformation designen
dc.subjectDelegationen
dc.subjectMoral hazarden
dc.subjectCareer concernsen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleOptimal quality certificationen
dc.typeWorking or discussion paperen
dc.contributor.sponsorEconomic & Social Research Councilen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.urlhttps://ideas.repec.org/p/san/wpecon/1904.htmlen
dc.identifier.grantnumberES/N01829X/1en


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