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dc.contributor.advisorBroadie, Sarah
dc.contributor.authorAganey, Diana
dc.coverage.spatial72en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-22T10:23:48Z
dc.date.available2011-06-22T10:23:48Z
dc.date.issued2011-06-06
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1883
dc.description.abstractThe belief in free will is something we are entitled to hold despite what determinism says. This notion however cannot be adequately explained or defended by traditional accounts of freedom amongst which, compatibilist and libertarian perspectives dominate the field of inquiry. I argue that an alternative approach is necessary to capture the full implications of what freedom as an idea contains and to establish this idea's validity, though one which exhibits none of the usual extravagances which philosophers so often pursue in their attempts at justification.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relationRobert Kaneen_US
dc.subjectFreedomen_US
dc.subjectLibertarianismen_US
dc.subject.lccBJ1468.5A4
dc.subject.lcshFree will and determinismen_US
dc.subject.lcshLibertarianismen_US
dc.titleFreedom as faithen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnameMPhil Master of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.publisher.departmentPhilosophy and Anthropologyen_US


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