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dc.contributor.authorBackes, Marvin
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-16T15:30:06Z
dc.date.available2019-09-16T15:30:06Z
dc.date.issued2019-09-05
dc.identifier.citationBackes , M 2019 , ' Epistemology and the law : why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01337-6en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 260820646
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 331572e6-ebb2-4e2b-b4a6-dd72cfedc1ef
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85073782150
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000549599700017
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/18481
dc.description.abstractThe primary aim of this paper is to defend the Lockean View—the view that a belief is epistemically justified iff it is highly probable—against a new family of objections. According to these objections, broadly speaking, the Lockean View ought to be abandoned because it is incompatible with, or difficult to square with, our judgments surrounding certain legal cases. I distinguish and explore three different versions of these objections—The Conviction Argument, the Argument from Assertion and Practical Reasoning, and the Comparative Probabilities Argument—but argue that none of them are successful. I also present some very general reasons for being pessimistic about the overall strategy of using legal considerations to evaluate epistemic theories; as we will see, there are good reasons to think that many of the considerations relevant to legal theorizing are ultimately irrelevant to epistemic theorizing.
dc.format.extent20
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2019. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectStatistical evidenceen
dc.subjectStandard of proofen
dc.subjectLockean Viewen
dc.subjectJustificationen
dc.subjectProof paradoxen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleEpistemology and the law : why there is no epistemic mileage in legal casesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01337-6
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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