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Epistemology and the law : why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases
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dc.contributor.author | Backes, Marvin | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-09-16T15:30:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-09-16T15:30:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-09-05 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Backes , M 2019 , ' Epistemology and the law : why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01337-6 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8116 | |
dc.identifier.other | PURE: 260820646 | |
dc.identifier.other | PURE UUID: 331572e6-ebb2-4e2b-b4a6-dd72cfedc1ef | |
dc.identifier.other | Scopus: 85073782150 | |
dc.identifier.other | WOS: 000549599700017 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18481 | |
dc.description.abstract | The primary aim of this paper is to defend the Lockean View—the view that a belief is epistemically justified iff it is highly probable—against a new family of objections. According to these objections, broadly speaking, the Lockean View ought to be abandoned because it is incompatible with, or difficult to square with, our judgments surrounding certain legal cases. I distinguish and explore three different versions of these objections—The Conviction Argument, the Argument from Assertion and Practical Reasoning, and the Comparative Probabilities Argument—but argue that none of them are successful. I also present some very general reasons for being pessimistic about the overall strategy of using legal considerations to evaluate epistemic theories; as we will see, there are good reasons to think that many of the considerations relevant to legal theorizing are ultimately irrelevant to epistemic theorizing. | |
dc.format.extent | 20 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Philosophical Studies | en |
dc.rights | Copyright © The Author(s) 2019. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. | en |
dc.subject | Statistical evidence | en |
dc.subject | Standard of proof | en |
dc.subject | Lockean View | en |
dc.subject | Justification | en |
dc.subject | Proof paradox | en |
dc.subject | B Philosophy (General) | en |
dc.subject | T-NDAS | en |
dc.subject.lcc | B1 | en |
dc.title | Epistemology and the law : why there is no epistemic mileage in legal cases | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.description.version | Publisher PDF | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Philosophy | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01337-6 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
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