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dc.contributor.authorKatsoulacos, Yannis
dc.contributor.authorMotchenkova, Evgenia
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-31T16:30:04Z
dc.date.available2019-07-31T16:30:04Z
dc.date.issued2019-07-29
dc.identifier.citationKatsoulacos , Y , Motchenkova , E & Ulph , D 2019 , ' Public and private antitrust enforcement for cartels : should there be a common approach to sanctioning based on the overcharge rate? ' , Revista de Economia Contemporânea , vol. 23 , no. 2 , e192321 . https://doi.org/10.1590/198055272321en
dc.identifier.issn1415-9848
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 259486178
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: d638f69f-22b5-4716-b713-d50922eda163
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/60195484
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/18217
dc.description.abstractWe review recent theoretical literature pointing to the ineffectiveness, in terms of welfare impact, of currently applied sanctioning regimes for cartels by Competition Authorities (CAs). We then provide a comparison of the regimes taking also into account criteria related to ease of implementation and transparency. We argue the case for switching to a penalty regime, in which the penalty base continues to be the currently dominant penalty base of cartel revenue but in which, in contrast to current practice, the penalty rate is based on the rate commonly estimated in order to calculate damages in private damage claims, that is, the overcharge rate.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofRevista de Economia Contemporâneaen
dc.rightsCopyright 2019 IE-UFRJ (Instituto de Economia da UFRJ). This is an open access article licence under a Creative Commons CC BY licence.en
dc.subjectAntitrust penaltiesen
dc.subjectAntitrust enforcementen
dc.subjectAntitrust lawen
dc.subjectCartelsen
dc.subjectHG Financeen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccHGen
dc.titlePublic and private antitrust enforcement for cartels : should there be a common approach to sanctioning based on the overcharge rate?en
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1590/198055272321
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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