Continuous-variable quantum digital signatures over insecure channels
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Digital signatures ensure the integrity of a classical message and the authenticity of its sender. Despite their far-reaching use in modern communication, currently used signature schemes rely on computational assumptions and will be rendered insecure by a quantum computer. We present a quantum digital signatures (QDS) scheme whose security is instead based on the impossibility of perfectly and deterministically distinguishing between quantum states. Our continuous-variable (CV) scheme relies on phase measurement of a distributed alphabet of coherent states and allows for secure message authentication against a quantum adversary performing collective beamsplitter and entangling-cloner attacks. Crucially, in the CV setting we allow for an eavesdropper on the quantum channels and yet retain shorter signature lengths than previous protocols with no eavesdropper. This opens up the possibility to implement CV QDS alongside existing CV quantum key distribution platforms with minimal modification.
Thornton , M , Scott , H , Croal , C & Korolkova , N 2019 , ' Continuous-variable quantum digital signatures over insecure channels ' , Physical Review. A, Atomic, molecular, and optical physics , vol. 99 , no. 3 , 032341 . https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.99.032341
Physical Review. A, Atomic, molecular, and optical physics
© 2019, American Physical Society. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher's policies. This is the final published version of the work, which was originally published at https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.99.032341
DescriptionFunding: The authors gratefully acknowledge the support from the Scottish Universities Physics Alliance (SUPA) and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC).
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