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dc.contributor.authorBouslah, Kais
dc.contributor.authorLiñares-Zegarra, José
dc.contributor.authorM'Zali, Bouchra
dc.contributor.authorScholtens, Bert
dc.identifier.citationBouslah , K , Liñares-Zegarra , J , M'Zali , B & Scholtens , B 2018 , ' CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities ' , British Accounting Review , vol. 50 , no. 1 , pp. 76-92 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 250058385
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 04c5fc16-0094-4254-8ee1-4e6455ca8fd6
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:293AB18F578948A53B244303A6D9E010
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85020621179
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000429517200006
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-5774-5191/work/69834987
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-8407-8929/work/82179577
dc.description.abstractThis study examines the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, and socially irresponsible activities using a large sample of U.S. firms during the period 1992–2012. Our results for the period before the 2007 financial crisis suggest that CEO risk-taking incentives are positively related to socially irresponsible activities. In addition, we find that a firm's socially responsible actions may act as a moderator, strengthening the aforementioned relationship. The results after the 2007 financial crisis show no evidence of a significant relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. This could be due to the increased scrutiny regarding compensation packages and the increased role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our results suggest that risk-taking incentives embedded in the CEO compensation scheme have implications for corporate policies toward socially irresponsible activities.
dc.relation.ispartofBritish Accounting Reviewen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2017, Elsevier Ltd. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectExecutive compensationen
dc.subjectCEO risk-taking incentivesen
dc.subjectSocially irresponsible activitiesen
dc.subjectHG Financeen
dc.titleCEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activitiesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Managementen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for the Study of Philanthropy & Public Gooden
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Responsible Banking and Financeen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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