Unstable inflation targets
Abstract
This paper studies long-run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment. When central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated, agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change in their econometric model by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares. Inflation targets can lead agents' beliefs to depart from rational expectations through two channels. First, implementing a higher inflation target can lead to overshooting of the target. Second, there can be nearly self-fulfilling inflation, disinflation, or deflation that arises as an endogenous response to shocks. Policy implications for implementing a higher target without deanchoring expectations are discussed.
Citation
Branch , W A & Evans , G W 2017 , ' Unstable inflation targets ' , Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , vol. 49 , no. 4 , pp. 767-806 . https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12397
Publication
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0022-2879Type
Journal article
Description
Financial support from National Science Foundation Grant no. SES-1025011 is gratefully acknowledged.Collections
Items in the St Andrews Research Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.