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dc.contributor.authorRutledge, Jonathan Curtis
dc.identifier.citationRutledge , J C 2019 , ' Perspectival Skeptical Theism ' , Faith and Philosophy , vol. In press .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 257793402
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: d6db6fc2-3795-455e-a38c-cb6274c5eec1
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-9521-8031/work/57568294
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000468129300004
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85076354621
dc.description.abstractSkeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure of inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.
dc.relation.ispartofFaith and Philosophyen
dc.rights© 2019 Society of Christian Philosophers. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectBT Doctrinal Theologyen
dc.titlePerspectival Skeptical Theismen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Divinityen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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