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dc.contributor.authorManzini, Paola
dc.contributor.authorMariotti, Marco
dc.identifier.citationManzini , P & Mariotti , M 2018 , ' Competing for attention : is the showiest also the best? ' , The Economic Journal , vol. 128 , no. 609 , pp. 827-844 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 242478337
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: e8fdfe0a-25b2-4f64-a3b8-fbd92e42f193
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85018318504
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000426526700012
dc.descriptionFinancial support from ESRC grant RES-000-22-3474 is gratefully acknowledgeden
dc.description.abstractThere are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prove that the structure of externalities in the technology of salience is key. Broadly speaking, positive externalities in salience favour correlation between quality and salience.
dc.relation.ispartofThe Economic Journalen
dc.rights© 2016, Royal Economic Society. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.titleCompeting for attention : is the showiest also the best?en
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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