Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorManzini, Paola
dc.contributor.authorMariotti, Marco
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-25T23:44:22Z
dc.date.available2019-04-25T23:44:22Z
dc.date.issued2018-03-01
dc.identifier.citationManzini , P & Mariotti , M 2018 , ' Competing for attention : is the showiest also the best? ' , The Economic Journal , vol. 128 , no. 609 , pp. 827-844 . https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12425en
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 242478337
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: e8fdfe0a-25b2-4f64-a3b8-fbd92e42f193
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85018318504
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000426526700012
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/17590
dc.descriptionFinancial support from ESRC grant RES-000-22-3474 is gratefully acknowledgeden
dc.description.abstractThere are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prove that the structure of externalities in the technology of salience is key. Broadly speaking, positive externalities in salience favour correlation between quality and salience.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofThe Economic Journalen
dc.rights© 2016, Royal Economic Society. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12425en
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleCompeting for attention : is the showiest also the best?en
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12425
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2019-04-26


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record