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dc.contributor.authorProsser, Simon
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-04T23:38:02Z
dc.date.available2019-04-04T23:38:02Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationProsser , S 2018 , ' Replies to Deng, Lee, and Skow ' , Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy , vol. 61 , no. 3 , pp. 328-350 . https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1385163en
dc.identifier.issn0020-174X
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 251138318
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: a279a0c0-9d5e-40f3-b669-245c96eb686f
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85031127982
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000424762500006
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-7444-2782/work/67525840
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/17455
dc.description.abstractThis paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on chapters 2 and 6. In chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.
dc.format.extent23
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofInquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophyen
dc.rights© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1385163en
dc.subjectTimeen
dc.subjectTemporal Experienceen
dc.subjectPassage of timeen
dc.subjectSpecious presenten
dc.subjectA-theoryen
dc.subjectB-theoryen
dc.subjectPeceptionen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleReplies to Deng, Lee, and Skowen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1385163
dc.description.statusNon peer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2019-04-05


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