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dc.contributor.authorJacinto, Bruno Miguel
dc.contributor.authorCotnoir, Aaron
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-19T13:30:13Z
dc.date.available2019-03-19T13:30:13Z
dc.date.issued2019-03-11
dc.identifier.citationJacinto , B M & Cotnoir , A 2019 , ' Models for hylomorphism ' , Journal of Philosophical Logic , vol. In press . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09501-3en
dc.identifier.issn0022-3611
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 256901635
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 81728d14-a03a-40ed-832e-c1a9380c5199
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85062872855
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/17312
dc.descriptionThe research and writing of this paper was supported in part by a 2017–2018 Leverhulme Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust.en
dc.description.abstractIn a series of papers (Fine et al., 1982; Fine, Noûs28(2), 137–158; 1994, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999) Fine develops his hylomorphic theory of embodiments. In this article, we supply a formal semantics for this theory that is adequate to the principles laid down for it in (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999). In Section 1, we lay out the theory of embodiments as Fine presents it. In Section 2, we argue on Cantorian grounds that the theory needs to be stabilized, and sketch some ways forward, discussing various choice points in modeling the view. In Section 3, we develop a formal semantics for the theory of embodiments by constructing embodiments in stages and restricting the domain of the second-order quantifiers. In Section 4 we give a few illustrative examples to show how the models deliver Finean hylomorphic consequences. In Section 5, we prove that Fine’s principles are sound with respect to this semantics. In Section 6 we present some inexpressibility results concerning Fine’s various notions of parthood and show that in our formal semantics these notions are all expressible using a single mereological primitive. In Section 7, we prove several mereological results stemming from the model theory, showing that the mereology is surprisingly robust. In Section 8, we draw some philosophical lessons from the formal semantics, and in particular respond to Koslicki’s (2008) main objection to Fine’s theory. In the appendix we present proofs of the inexpressibility results of Section 6.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Philosophical Logicen
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectObjectsen
dc.subjectParthooden
dc.subjectCompositionen
dc.subjectMereologyen
dc.subjectHylomorphismen
dc.subjectRigid embodimenten
dc.subjectVariable embodimenten
dc.subjectQua-objectsen
dc.subjectAtomismen
dc.subjectGunken
dc.subjectJunken
dc.subjectAristotleen
dc.subjectNeo-Aristotelianen
dc.subjectCantoren
dc.subjectCardinalityen
dc.subjectIterativeen
dc.subjectHierarchyen
dc.subjectB Philosophy. Psychology. Religionen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBen
dc.titleModels for hylomorphismen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09501-3
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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