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dc.contributor.authorHawley, Katherine Jane
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-04T17:30:05Z
dc.date.available2019-01-04T17:30:05Z
dc.date.issued2019-01-02
dc.identifier.citationHawley , K J 2019 , ' Conspiracy Theories, Impostor Syndrome, and Distrust ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. First online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1222-4en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 257048001
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: c0e02d74-f9e9-42d3-9414-9a1f25572866
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85059587179
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-8179-2550/work/52281191
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000460037300007
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/16780
dc.description.abstractConspiracy theorists believe that powerful agents are conspiring to achieve their nefarious aims and also to orchestrate a cover-up. People who suffer from impostor syndrome believe that they are not talented enough for the professional positions they find themselves in, and that they risk being revealed as inadequate. These are quite different outlooks on reality, and there is no reason to think that they are mutually reinforcing. Nevertheless, there are intriguing parallels between the patterns of trust and distrust which underpin both conspiracy theorising and impostor thinking. In both cases subjects distrust standard sources of information, instead regarding themselves as especially insightful into the underlying facts of the matter. In both cases, seemingly-anomalous data takes on special significance. And in both cases, the content of belief dictates the epistemic behaviour of the believer. This paper explores these parallels, to suggest new avenues of research into both conspiracy theorising and impostor syndrome, including questions about whether impostor syndrome inevitably involves a personal failure of rationality, and issues about how, if at all, it is possible to convince others to abandon either conspiracy theories or impostor attitudes.
dc.format.extent12
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectConspiracy theoriesen
dc.subjectImposter sundromeen
dc.subjectImposter phenomenonen
dc.subjectDistrusten
dc.subjectBD Speculative Philosophyen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBDen
dc.titleConspiracy Theories, Impostor Syndrome, and Distrusten
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.St Andrews Centre for Exoplanet Scienceen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1222-4
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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