Show simple item record

Files in this item


Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorBroadie, Sarah Jean
dc.identifier.citationBroadie , S J 2016 , ' The knowledge unacknowledged in the Theaetetus ' , Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , vol. 51 , pp. 87-117 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 246903988
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: b914cd23-7e84-4915-9538-1ab0960606fe
dc.descriptionISBN: 9780198795797, 9780198795803 Edited by Victor Castonen
dc.description.abstractKnowledge, says Hypothesis 3 of the Theaetetus, is true judgement with an account. Socrates explicates this additively: true judgement is the base, and something called ‘an account’ the addendum. The formula is additive not because it shows knowledge entailing true judgement while being something more. Additivity implies something stronger: that the true judgement that amounts to knowledge if combined with something else would have been available on its own in the absence of this something else, hence in the absence of knowledge. The paper explores what the Theaetetus and Sophist show about this additive theory of knowledge. It argues that (at least for some cases of knowledge) the theory is rejected in the Sophist, and has already been called into question in connection with Hypothesis 2 of the Theaetetus.
dc.relation.ispartofOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophyen
dc.rights© Sarah Broadie 2016. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleThe knowledge unacknowledged in the Theaetetusen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record