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dc.contributor.advisorHawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane)
dc.contributor.authorHummel, Patrik Alexander
dc.coverage.spatial315 p.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-03T09:47:42Z
dc.date.available2018-12-03T09:47:42Z
dc.date.issued2018-06-28
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/16607
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis, I argue that the interdependence between personal identity and practical concerns is overstated. In paradigmatic places where philosophers and common sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should reason and care, or vice versa, the two spheres are in fact neutral to each other. I defend this claim by considering four specific cases. First, a rough characterization of the distinction between the complex and the simple view is that the former takes personal identity to consist in other relations, whereas the latter does not. I argue that the extreme claim according to which the complex view fails to give reasons for future-directed concern can be resisted. We maintain forward-looking attitudes and projects not because someone will be us, but because we relate to future selves in other, more important ways. Second, I argue that intuitions in a range of popular imaginary cases are contaminated by practical concerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from straightforward. Third, I argue that on a closer look, the complex versus simple distinction is confused. It thus cannot be what grounds differences in judgements on what matters. Debates about personal identity should be framed in terms of better understood notions. Finally, I argue that it is not a constraint on rational transformative choice that decision-maker and transforming individual are identical. Moreover, whether we are deciding for ourselves or for others - the importance of informed consent for transformative treatments is not diminished by the decision-maker's failure to projectively imagine the outcomes.en_US
dc.description.sponsorship"I am grateful for funding from the German Academic Exchange Ser- vice (DAAD) and the Royal Institute of Philosophy as well as a fee waiver from the University of St Andrews. I also thank the University of St Andrews and my supervisors for allowing me to take a leave of absence for an internship with the Global Health Ethics Unit of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. The internship was support by a Carlo Schmid Fellowship from DAAD." - Acknowledgementsen
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.relationHummel, P. (2017). Against the Complex Versus Simple Distinction". In: Erkenntnis 82.2, pp. 363-378.en_US
dc.subjectPersonal identityen_US
dc.subjectPractical reasonen_US
dc.subjectComplex viewen_US
dc.subjectSimple viewen_US
dc.subjectTransformative experienceen_US
dc.subjectSelf-concernen_US
dc.subjectPsychological continuity theoryen_US
dc.subjectNarrative identityen_US
dc.subjectInformed consenten_US
dc.subject.lccBF697.H8
dc.subject.lccIdentity (Psychology)en
dc.subject.lccPersonalityen
dc.subject.lccPractical reasonen
dc.titlePersonal identity and practical reasonen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorDeutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD)en_US
dc.contributor.sponsorRoyal Institute of Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorSt Andrews and Stirling Graduate Programme in Philosophy (SASP)en_US
dc.contributor.sponsorUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Travel Funden_US
dc.contributor.sponsorUniversity of St Andrewsen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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