Dominance solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences
Abstract
This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.
Citation
Gerasimou , G 2019 , ' Dominance solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences ' , Economic Theory Bulletin , vol. 7 , no. 2 , pp. 165-171 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2
Publication
Economic Theory Bulletin
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
2196-1093Type
Journal article
Collections
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