Conceptual Marxism and truth : Inquiry symposium on Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth
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In Replacing Truth (2013), Scharp takes the concept of truth to be fundamentally incoherent. As such, Scharp reckons it to be unsuited for systematic philosophical theorising and in need of replacement – at least for regions of thought and talk which permit liar sentences and their ilk to be formulated. This replacement methodology is radical because it not only recommends that the concept of truth be replaced (in troublesome domains), but that the word ‘true’ be replaced too. Only Tarski has attempted anything like it before. I dub such a view Conceptual Marxism. In assessing this view, my goals are fourfold: to summarise the many components of Scharp’s theory of truth; to highlight what I take to be some of the excess baggage carried by the view; to assess whether, and to what extent, the extreme methodology on offer is at all called for; finally, to briefly propose a less radical replacement strategy for resolving the liar paradox.
Greenough , P 2019 , ' Conceptual Marxism and truth : Inquiry s ymposium on Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth ' , Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy , vol. 62 , no. 4 , pp. 403-421 . https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1287919
Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
© 2016 the Author. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1287919
DescriptionWork on this article has received funding from the project FFI2013-45968-P, financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competition (MINECO).
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