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dc.contributor.authorBerto, Francesco
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-04T11:30:08Z
dc.date.available2018-09-04T11:30:08Z
dc.date.issued2017-12
dc.identifier255688937
dc.identifier9a0fc2d8-e315-46bc-8710-0e21f05d9d53
dc.identifier85011290473
dc.identifier.citationBerto , F 2017 , ' Impossible worlds and the logic of imagination ' , Erkenntnis , vol. 82 , no. 6 , pp. 1277-1297 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9875-5en
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132002
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/15959
dc.descriptionThis paper is published within the project “The Logic of Conceivability”, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), grant number 681404.en
dc.description.abstractI want to model a finite, fallible cognitive agent who imagines that p in the sense of mentally representing a scenario—a configuration of objects and properties—correctly described by p. I propose to capture imagination, so understood, via variably strict world quantifiers, in a modal framework including both possible and so-called impossible worlds. The latter secure lack of classical logical closure for the relevant mental states, while the variability of strictness captures how the agent imports information from actuality in the imagined non-actual scenarios. Imagination turns out to be highly hyperintensional, but not logically anarchic. Section 1 sets the stage and impossible worlds are quickly introduced in Sect. 2. Section 3 proposes to model imagination via variably strict world quantifiers. Section 4 introduces the formal semantics. Section 5 argues that imagination has a minimal mereological structure validating some logical inferences. Section 6 deals with how imagination under-determines the represented contents. Section 7 proposes additional constraints on the semantics, validating further inferences. Section 8 describes some welcome invalidities. Section 9 examines the effects of importing false beliefs into the imagined scenarios. Finally, Sect. 10 hints at possible developments of the theory in the direction of two-dimensional semantics.
dc.format.extent21
dc.format.extent312864
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofErkenntnisen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
dc.subjectLogicen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.subject.lccBCen
dc.titleImpossible worlds and the logic of imaginationen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10670-017-9875-5
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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