Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorBerto, Francesco
dc.contributor.authorFrench, Rohan
dc.contributor.authorPriest, Graham
dc.contributor.authorRipley, David
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-04T10:30:16Z
dc.date.available2018-09-04T10:30:16Z
dc.date.issued2018-08
dc.identifier255688849
dc.identifier4f12312e-20c2-422b-a520-2daa69a2d37e
dc.identifier85027489272
dc.identifier.citationBerto , F , French , R , Priest , G & Ripley , D 2018 , ' Williamson on counterpossibles ' , Journal of Philosophical Logic , vol. 47 , no. 4 , pp. 693-713 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9446-xen
dc.identifier.issn0022-3611
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132026
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/15956
dc.descriptionThis research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), grant number 681404.en
dc.description.abstractA counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.
dc.format.extent21
dc.format.extent2920420
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Philosophical Logicen
dc.subjectCounterfactual modal epistemologyen
dc.subjectCounterpossible conditionalsen
dc.subjectImpossible worldsen
dc.subjectNonvacuismen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleWilliamson on counterpossiblesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10992-017-9446-x
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record