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dc.contributor.advisorEbert, Philip A.
dc.contributor.authorCarrick, Laurence
dc.coverage.spatialviii, 173 p.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-06T11:27:01Z
dc.date.available2018-06-06T11:27:01Z
dc.date.issued2018-06-28
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/13770
dc.description.abstractThis thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subjectKnowledgeen_US
dc.subjectScepticismen_US
dc.subjectSceptical hypothesesen_US
dc.subjectEpistemic closureen_US
dc.subjectEpistemological contextualismen_US
dc.subjectError theoriesen_US
dc.subjectDual-process theoriesen_US
dc.subject.lccB837.C28
dc.subject.lcshSkepticismen
dc.subject.lcshKnowledge, Theory ofen
dc.subject.lcshContextualism (Philosophy)en
dc.titleWhat do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledgeen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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