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dc.contributor.advisorBroadie, Sarah
dc.contributor.authorEcheñique, Javier
dc.coverage.spatial220en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-17T14:30:48Z
dc.date.available2010-11-17T14:30:48Z
dc.date.issued2010-09-22
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1348
dc.description.abstractIn his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.subjectMoral responsibilityen_US
dc.subjectVoluntaryen_US
dc.subjectAristotleen_US
dc.subject.lccB430.E3
dc.subject.lcshAristotle. Ethica
dc.subject.lcshResponsibilityen_US
dc.titleAristotle on ethical ascription : a philosophical exercise in the interpretation of the role and significance of the hekousios/akousios distinction in Aristotle's Ethicsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorBeca Presidente de la Repúblicaen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted within the work, this item's license for re-use is described as Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported