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dc.contributor.advisorSkorupski, John
dc.contributor.advisorBroadie, Sarah
dc.contributor.authorHurtig, Kent
dc.coverage.spatial296 p.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-25T15:27:15Z
dc.date.available2018-04-25T15:27:15Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/13223
dc.description.abstractCan we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically satisfying answer to the familiar 'why should I be moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of wrongness, I outline (and, to some degree, defend) the metaethical and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I also consider and reject the 'internalist' (or as it can also be described, the neo-Humean) answer to 'why should I be moral?'. The account I end up with is decidedly non-consequentialist and it is consistent with common-sense morality. It also provides a way of showing why moral considerations (in competition with non-moral considerations) are overridingly normative in a way that is consistent with our best current understanding of what practical reason requires of us.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subject.lccBJ1031.H8
dc.subject.lcshEthics.en
dc.subject.lcshReason.en
dc.titleWhy should I be moral? : toward a defence of the categoricity and normative authority of moral considerationsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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