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dc.contributor.advisorHawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane)
dc.contributor.authorNowak, Lisa Rebecca
dc.coverage.spatial279 p.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-24T11:15:16Z
dc.date.available2018-04-24T11:15:16Z
dc.date.issued2018-06-28
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/13193
dc.description.abstractThis thesis is concerned with philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness, with each chapter exploring different philosophical issues. Chapter one delineates the central concept around which the rest of the work revolves: the stigma of mental illness. It provides an outline of the stigma mechanism, how it applies to mental illness, why it is such a large public health concern and what has been done so far to combat it. Chapter two is concerned with the application of recent literature in the philosophy of implicit bias to the topic of mental illness. It suggests that we have hitherto been preoccupied with explicit formulations of the stigma mechanism, but argues that there are distinctive issues involved in combatting forms of discrimination in which the participants are not cognisant of their attitudes or actions, and that anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness should take note. Chapter three applies the philosophical literature concerning the ethics of our epistemic practices to the stigma of mental illness. It contains an analysis of how epistemic injustice- primarily in the forms of testimonial injustice and stereotype threat- affects those with mental illnesses. The fourth chapter brings in issues in the philosophy of science (particularly the philosophy of psychiatry) to explore the possibility of intervening on the stigma process to halt the stigma of mental illness. The first candidate (preventing labelling) is discounted, and the second (combatting stereotype) is tentatively endorsed. The fifth chapter is concerned with how language facilitates the stigma of mental illness. It suggests that using generics to talk about mental illness (whether the knowledge structure conveyed is inaccurate or accurate) is deeply problematic. In the former, it conveys insidious forms of social stereotyping. In the latter, it propagates misinformation by presenting the category as a quintessential one.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectGenericsen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of psychiatryen_US
dc.subjectMental illnessen_US
dc.subjectStigmaen_US
dc.subjectEpistemic injusticeen_US
dc.subjectImplicit biasen_US
dc.subjectClassificationen_US
dc.subject.lccRC437.5N7
dc.subject.lcshMental illness--Social aspectsen
dc.subject.lcshPsychiatry--Philosophyen
dc.subject.lcshStigma (Social psychology)en
dc.titlePhilosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illnessen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorScottish Graduate School for Art and Humanities (SGSAH)en_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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