Looks and perceptual justification
MetadataShow full item record
Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks view of the justification of simple visual beliefs. According to the looks view, such beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning how the relevant things look. Unlike under classical foundationalism, under the looks view as I develop it, these reasons are public. They are public with respect to both their content and possession: with respect to content, they are not about ourselves and our experiences, and with respect to their possession, many people can have the very same looks-related reasons.
McGrath , M 2018 , ' Looks and perceptual justification ' , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , vol. 96 , no. 1 , pp. 110-133 . https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12289
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Non peer reviewed
Copyright © 2016 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12289
Items in the St Andrews Research Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.