Show simple item record

Files in this item


Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorRobbins, Erin
dc.contributor.authorShepard, Jason
dc.contributor.authorRochat, Philippe
dc.identifier.citationRobbins , E , Shepard , J & Rochat , P 2017 , ' Variations in judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation across eight cultures ' , Cognition , vol. 164 , pp. 22-30 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 249500123
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 4da5d618-3ae0-4430-82e3-de2a342d8334
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:30D5F419178623F16F567001B656A690
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85016433945
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000402212900003
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-0404-453X/work/65014384
dc.description.abstractIndividuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe or side-effect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven adult cohorts of eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well as ratings of blame and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect effect, and even a reversal of the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) where participants were more likely to judge the good side effect as intentional. Three follow-up experiments indicate that this reversal of the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be linked to the perception of the status of the protagonist. These results highlight the importance of factoring cultural context in our understanding of moral cognition.
dc.rights© 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at:
dc.subjectMoral cognitionen
dc.subjectMoral evaluationen
dc.subjectIntentional actionen
dc.subjectSide-effect effecten
dc.subjectCross-cultural psychologyen
dc.subjectBF Psychologyen
dc.titleVariations in judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation across eight culturesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Psychology and Neuroscienceen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Social Learning & Cognitive Evolutionen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record