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dc.contributor.advisorHawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane)
dc.contributor.authorHabgood-Coote, Joshua
dc.coverage.spatial[10], 232 p.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-30T11:45:26Z
dc.date.available2017-08-30T11:45:26Z
dc.date.issued2017-12-08
dc.identifieruk.bl.ethos.722985
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/11566
dc.description.abstractThis thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of languageen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophical methodologyen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of linguisticsen_US
dc.subject.lcshKnowledge, Theory ofen
dc.subject.lcshLanguage and languages--Philosophyen
dc.subject.lcshLinguistics--Philosophyen
dc.subject.lcshMethodologyen
dc.titleKnowledge-how : linguistic and philosophical considerationsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorArts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)en_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US
dc.publisher.departmentThe University of Stirlingen_US


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