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dc.contributor.authorKatsoulacos, Yannis
dc.contributor.authorMotchenkova, Evgenia
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David Tregear
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-28T23:32:20Z
dc.date.available2017-07-28T23:32:20Z
dc.date.issued2015-09
dc.identifier.citationKatsoulacos , Y , Motchenkova , E & Ulph , D T 2015 , ' Penalizing cartels : the case for basing penalties on the price overcharge ' International Journal of Industrial Organization , vol. 42 , pp. 70-80 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.07.007en
dc.identifier.issn0167-7187
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 152489827
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 2184216d-15c3-4df1-897e-71e8d59d8877
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84939239769
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464518
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000362058900007
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/11323
dc.descriptionYannis Katsoulacos acknowledges that this research has been co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund – ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program "Education and Lifelong Learning" of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) - Research Funding Program: ARISTEIA – CoLEG.en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the prices charged by those cartels that do form; and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form (deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed penalties in all welfare-relevant respects. For the other three types of penalty we show that, for those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those based on profit)while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) average overcharge; (b) average consumer surplus; (c) average total welfare.
dc.format.extent46
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Industrial Organizationen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.07.007en
dc.subjectAntitrust Enforcementen
dc.subjectAntitrust Lawen
dc.subjectCartelen
dc.subjectOligopolyen
dc.subjectRepeated Gamesen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titlePenalizing cartels : the case for basing penalties on the price overchargeen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.07.007
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2017-07-28


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