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dc.contributor.authorPummer, Theron Gene
dc.identifier.citationPummer , T G 2018 , ' Spectrum arguments and hypersensitivity ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. 175 , no. 7 , pp. 1729-1744 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 249984481
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: c726db35-5a63-48e4-b687-4a4e15eb322d
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85019686210
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000434161600010
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-0147-9917/work/69029343
dc.description.abstractLarry Temkin famously argues that what he calls spectrum arguments yield strong reason to reject Transitivity, according to which the ‘all-things-considered better than’ relation is transitive. Spectrum arguments do reveal that the conjunctions of independently plausible claims are inconsistent with Transitivity. But I argue that there is very strong independent reason to reject such conjunctions of claims, and thus that the fact that they are inconsistent with Transitivity does not yield strong reason to reject Transitivity.
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectSpectrum argumentsen
dc.subjectSorites argumentsen
dc.subjectB Philosophy. Psychology. Religionen
dc.titleSpectrum arguments and hypersensitivityen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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