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Can bank boards prevent misconduct?

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dc.contributor.authorNguyen, Duc Duy
dc.contributor.authorHagendorff, Jens
dc.contributor.authorEshraghi, Arman
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-11T23:33:19Z
dc.date.available2017-04-11T23:33:19Z
dc.date.issued2016-03
dc.identifier.citationNguyen , D D , Hagendorff , J & Eshraghi , A 2016 , ' Can bank boards prevent misconduct? ' , Review of Finance , vol. 20 , no. 1 , pp. 1-36 . https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfv011en
dc.identifier.issn1572-3097
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 216885983
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 62bb6ca2-b85d-4e7a-9fd6-64181f6892a8
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84964270613
dc.identifier.otherBibCode: NIS216885983
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/10610
dc.description.abstractWe study regulatory enforcement actions issued against US banks to show that both board monitoring and advising are effective in preventing misconduct by banks. While better monitoring by boards prevents all categories of misconduct, better advising prevents misconduct of a technical nature. Board monitoring increases the likelihood that misconduct is detected, increases the penalties imposed on the CEO, and alleviates shareholder wealth losses following the detection of misconduct by regulators. Our article offers novel insights on how to structure bank boards to prevent bank misconduct.
dc.format.extent36
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Financeen
dc.rights© The Authors 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Finance Association. All rights reserved. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at doi: 10.1093/rof/rfv011en
dc.subjectBanksen
dc.subjectEnforcement actionsen
dc.subjectBoard monitoringen
dc.subjectBoard advisingen
dc.subjectHG Financeen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subjectR2Den
dc.subject.lccHGen
dc.titleCan bank boards prevent misconduct?en
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Managementen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Responsible Banking and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfv011
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2018-03-01
dc.identifier.urlhttp://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/1/1en


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